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The purpose of this paper is to determine empirically whether or not there is systematic price rigging
in three Australian betting markets: Horse, harness and greyhound racing. We present a simple model
which shows the conditions under which it is optimal for insiders to rig prices by deliberate under-
performance in some races. We then show how an empirical analysis of the relationship between win
and place probabilities in conjunction with observed patterns of betting behavior, may be used to
establish the presence of price rigging. It is shown that there is no significant systematic price rigging
in these markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to determine empirically whether or not there
is systematic price rigging in three Australian betting markets: horse, harness
and greyhound racing. We present a simple model which shows the conditions
under which it is optimal for insiders to rig prices by deliberate under-
performance in some races. We then show how an empirical analysis of the
relationship between win and place probabilities in conjunction with observed
patterns of betting behavior, may be used to establish the presence of price
rigging. It is shown that there is no significant systematic price rigging in these
markets.
There has been recent research into corruption in other spheres,
1
but, to
the best of our knowledge, this is the first to test for systematic corruption in
the racing industry. That there is a perception of cheating is well-known.
As we write, the British riders Robert Winston, Luke Fletcher, Robbie
Fitzpatrick and Fran Ferris have been informed that they will be charged with
corruption.
2
In an unrelated affair, Kieren Fallon has been charged with race
fixing.
3
And such cases have been observed in all countries where animals
race and betting is permitted on the outcome. In this paper, we attempt to
determine whether cheating is the exception or the rule in the Australian case.
4
Our method rests on the isolation of a group of horses and dogs which may
be deemed as candidates for deliberate underperformance. The purpose of
such underperformance today is to get better odds on the animal in its next
race. In terms of the betting market, animals may be divided into the following
categories:
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1. Those which are plunged to win in the current race. In other words,
those whose odds have shortened in the win betting market.
2. Those which are plunged to place
5
in the current race. In other words,
those whose odds have shortened in the place betting market.
3. Those animals which have never been plunged.
4. Those animals who are plunged for either the win or place in other
races, but not in today’s race.
To the extent that an animal’s connections have an incentive to rig prices
in their favor by deliberate underperformance, it is unlikely that they would
engage in such behavior systematically while, at the same time, betting
conspicuously on the animal to perform well. We therefore exclude animals in
categories 1 and 2 from consideration. Similarly, animals which are never
plunged do not provide connections with large profits via betting and thus are,
likewise, not evident candidates for deliberate underperformance. This leaves
us with category 4. The fact that these animals are sometimes plunged
indicates that their connections seek to gain from betting. This, according to
the model presented in the next section, may provide them with an incentive
for occasional deliberate underperformance. To the extent that this is the case,
we would expect it to happen when the animals are not plunged. It is thus the
animals in this group which are our candidates for being, in Australian racing
parlance, “not on the job” (NOTJ).
In order to test for deliberate underperformance, we run a series of
regressions designed to compare the performance of NOTJ animals with
members of the other three groups. In section III we show that, not only don’t
these animals systematically under perform relative to the animals in other
categories, they always outperform significantly the animals that are never
plunged.
II. THE MODEL
Consider a cohort of n new racing horses. Their racing life spans over a
number of seasons, where they compete against each other, and their owners
wish to maximize profits over their lives. The quality of the horses is
represented by their true winning probabilities, p
1
; . . . ; p
n
, each of which is
known only to its respective owner,
P
n
i¼1
p
i
¼ 1; p
i
$ 0; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n:
In the theory and the empirical part below we make use of the probabilities
of each horse to gain 2
nd
and 3
rd
place. In order to calculate such probabilities,
in particular from the winning probabilities p
i
, one needs a probabilistic model
of the race. For every such model there is an exact relationship between the
win and place probabilities. See appendix 1 for an example of such a model
and the implied relationship. In general the probability of a horse getting
second or third as a function of the probability of winning has the shape of an
inverted U. A hopeless horse has a tiny chance of getting second or third and
so also has a super star that nearly always wins. Alas, we don’t know the actual
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model of the races because it is part of the question we pose. Inter alia, a
rigged race has a different model from a fair one.
The profits come from prize money and from betting. The price of betting
on horse i is determined in the betting market by its winning record which can
be manipulated by its owner by not always trying to win. Suppose in each
racing season there are k races where the same n horses always compete. We
look now at a season as the constituent game that is repeated over the life of
the horses. A strategy for owner i in this game is a k-tuple
ð f
1
i
; s
1
i
;W
1
i
;T
1
i
Þ; . . . . . . ; ð f
k
i
; s
k
i
;W
k
i
; T
k
i
Þ
 
where f
j
i
¼
1 i tries towin race j
0 otherwise
"
and
s
j
i
¼
1 i tries to come secondor third; but not first; in race j
0 i tries to come fourth orworse in race j
:
"
Note that 0 # f
j
i
þ s
j
i
# 1 for every i and j. If f
j
i
þ s
j
i
¼ 0 the horse is made
to run out of a place, if possible.W
j
i
is the amount the owner of horse i bets on
its horse for the win only in race j and T
j
i
is the amount he bets “each way” in
that race. Thus, in total he spendsW
j
i
þ 2T
j
i
in race j, whereW
j
i
þ T
j
i
has been
bet in total for the win and T
j
i
has been bet for the place.
Suppose that in race j the effort vector is ð f
j
1
; s
j
1
Þ; ð f
j
2
; s
j
2
Þ; . . . . . . ; ð f
j
n
; s
j
n
Þ
 
.
This has, of course, strong implications for the winning probability of
each horse i. This probability falls to zero for a horse that does not try and
thereby raises that of the other horses. (See Appendix 1 for an example).
Denote by
~
p
j
i
,
~
~
p
j
i
, and
~
~
~
p
j
i
the probabilities of horse i to win race j, to run second
and to run third, respectively, given the effort vector in that race.
The probabilities that horse i arrive second and third in race j are
developed in the appendix. The place probability of horse i in race j, donated
[
p
j
i
, which is the probability to come either first, second or third is the sum of
the three i.e.
[
p
j
i
¼
~
p
j
i
þ
~
~
p
j
i
þ
~
~
~
p
j
i
While p
i
is private information, we assume that the actual expected rates
of success of horse i over the season given the owners’ strategies, i.e.
1
k
P
k
j¼1
~
p
j
i
for the win and,
1
k
P
k
j¼1
[
p
j
i
to run a place, are known to the betting
public. Therefore the former would be the price of the win bet in every race of
the season i.e. the price of the contingent claim offering $1 if horse i wins and
zero otherwise, while the price of the place bet would be a quarter of that. This
is because, in the Australian market, for all races where number of starters is at
least eight
6
, the place odds offered by bookmakers are 1/4 the win odds.
Deliberate underperformance also involves a risk for the owner. The races
are videoed, closely monitored and investigated if a suspicion arises. Assume
S is the expected penalty for the “small” offence of any i in race j of
f
j
i
¼ 0; s
j
i
¼ 1. That is, S is the product of the penalty times the probability of
being caught not trying to win race j but trying to run a place. Similarly let L
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be the expected penalty for the “large” offence of any i in race j of
f
j
i
¼ 0; s
j
i
¼ 0. In practice, the penalties for the two offences are identical, the
guilty party being barred from the racecourse for some period and so losing
any income associated with training, riding or driving and on-course betting
for the relevant period, but the probabilities are different.
On the basis of these assumptions we can write the expected profit of
owner i, which he/she attempts to maximize if risk-neutral, as
P
i
¼
X
k
j¼1
~
p
j
i
Pr izeþ
W
j
i
þ T
j
i
ð1=kÞ
P
k
l¼1
~p
l
i
 !
þ
[
p
j
i
W
j
i
þ 2T
j
i
ð4=kÞ
P
k
l¼1
~p
l
i
2 W
j
i
þ 2T
j
i
 
" #
2 S
X
k
l¼1
12 f
l
i
 
s
l
i
2 L
X
k
l¼1
12 f
l
i
2 s
l
i
 
The n owners of the horses play between them a game the structure of
which was laid out heretofore. The strategy for each owner i is how strongly to
perform i.e. whether to attempt a win ð f
j
i
¼ 1; s
j
i
¼ 0Þ, run 2
nd
or 3
rd
ð f
j
i
¼
0; s
j
i
¼ 1Þ or “nowhere” ð f
j
i
¼ 0; s
j
i
¼ 0Þ and how much to bet for the win and
each way in each race. The full details of the equilibrium of the game are not
of interest to us, but the following aspects are of importance in determining
whether or not prices are actually rigged.
Claim 1: All owners trying to win every race is not a Nash equilibrium of
the game if at least one owner i can bet in each race an amount more than the
expected prize plus the expected penalty S i.e. W
i
þ 2T
i
. p
i
Prize þ S.
Proof: Consider the point of everybody always trying to win. All races are
identical so we can suppress the race index. Owner i’s profit is then:
Pi ¼ k p
i
Pr izeþ ðW
i
þ T
i
Þ=p
i
 
þ
[
p
i
W
i
þ 2T
i
4p
i
2 ðW
i
þ 2TÞ
 
¼ k p
i
Pr izeþ
[
p
i
4p
i
W
i
þ
[
p
i
2p
i
2 1
 
T
i
 
where
[
p
i
is calculated according to a fairly run race. Owner i can gain by
deviating to the strategy of, say, trying to win only a fraction a of the races,
randomly selected, but still trying to run a place in the others. By doing so he
will win on average only a fraction a of the races and the betting price of his
horse to win will cut to a times its value. It will not change, though, his place
probability because probability is shifted from first to second place but the
sum is intact. Consequently he will participate in ak of the races in the betting
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and risk S for the (1 2 a)k races of not trying. The new profit is
P
i
ðaÞ ¼ ak p
i
Pr izeþ
W
i
þT
i
ap
i
 
þ
[
p
i
W
i
þ2T
i
4ap
i
2 ðW
i
þ2T
i
Þ
 
2 ð12aÞkS
¼ k ap
i
Pr izeþ 1þ
[
p
i
4p
i
2a
 
W
i
þ 1þ
[
p
i
2p
i
22a
 
T
i
 
2 kð12aÞS
andPiðaÞ.P
i
¼P
i
ð1Þaswellas
›P
i
ðaÞ
›a
, 0 if W
i
þ2T
i
. p
i
Prizeþ S:
Note that:
1. The condition in the claim, W
i
þ 2T
i
. p
i
Prize þ S may be hard to
meet, not only in lucrative races, but also if the insider has few sources
of income away from the track.
2. Profit increases in W
i
and in T
i
so betting will be increased to its limit.
3. Deliberate underperformance can be prevented by either limiting the
sums insiders may bet W
i
þ 2T
i
or by increasing the prize or the
expected penalty.
Corollary: The game has no equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof: The deviation in the proof of the claim must be randomized or else the
betting public and the other owners will take advantage of it by betting on the
horse when it tries to win. The same type of deviation is advantageous to every
owner from every point of pure strat egies by increasing the return on a win
and saving on the cost of betting.
III. RESULTS
In order to test the hypothesis that there is systematic deliberate
underperformance at Australian race tracks, we need to show that NOTJ
animals systematically underperform other categories of animals. We first
derive the best unbiased estimate of winning probabilities that we can get. In
order to do this, we run conditional logit regressions
7
to explain winning as a
simple polynomial function of ALL prices and other information at our
disposal. The results are shown in Table 1. We then use these “objective”
winning probabilities to explain the performance of the four categories of
animals noted in the Introduction, viz; those never plunged, those plunged for
the win (and, perhaps also the place) in the current race, those plunged for the
place (but not for the win) in the current race and, those that are plunged some
other time, but not today and may thus not be on the job. As explained in the
appendix, we use tote odds throughout in spite of the fact that insiders certainly
prefer betting with bookies. In doing so, we rely on Schnytzer and Shilony
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(1995), where we showed that plunges with bookmakers are transferred to tote
prices via outsiders who observe the inside trading.
As to our a priori expectations, the theoretical model presented in the
previous section provides a condition under which deliberate underperformance
is likely to occur. Whether or not this condition is met is an empirical question
about which we had no strong priors. However, it does seem reasonable to argue
that, to the extent that there is deliberate underperformance and consequent price
rigging, it would manifest itself differently in the three different types of racing.
Thus, in our model we distinguish between, on the one hand, underperformance
of a strong kind, whereby the aim is to run out of the money and, on the other, a
weak form, where the idea is not to win but still run a place. It is difficult to
imagine how such a distinction might be managed systematically in the case of
greyhound racing, where there is no human intervention once the dogs are on the
track, there are no legal constraints once the race is underway, and
underperformance is largely a matter of feeding (and possibly drug) routines.
Bycontrast, in harness racing, not onlydodrivers often ownor train their charges,
they are also permitted to bet and horses drawn on the second row at the start can
easily be run into pockets fromwhich they can never again be expected to see the
light of day. Thus, fine tuning is evidently possible, provided thatmonitoring and
punishment regimes are sub-optimal. The case of thoroughbred racing is
somewhere in between: there is human intervention on the track but jockeys
generally do not own or train their horses and are never permitted to bet. They
therefore, at least in principle, provide at least something of a principal-agent
problem to the connections who wish to indulge in price rigging.
Consider first, as an aside, one of the interesting features of Table 1. The
market prices for these races – neither for the win nor the place, nor early in
the betting nor late - take no account of NOTJ animals, in spite of their
significant winning proclivities. This type of weak form inefficiency has
never, to our knowledge, been pointed out and warrants further study.
Our strategy for comparing the performance of the animals in different
categories is very straight forward. We run conditional logit regressions to
explain, respectively, winning, running second and running third, and we run
simple logit regressions
8
to explain running out of the money. In all cases,
these are run as functions of our Table 1 estimates of winning probability and
its square (in accordance with the theoretical results presented in the
appendix) as well as dummies for plunged and NOTJ animals and interaction
terms. The results are presented in Tables 2 through 5.
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the results is how little they differ
between the different types of racing. All coefficient signs are identical and
magnitudes (albeit not easy to interpret in these kinds of regressions) are very
similar. The only difference at all rests in the fact that the dummies for place
plunges and their interaction terms are not uniformly significant or insignificant
in the regressions for a place. Further, these differencesmake intuitive sense: Just
as deliberate underperformancewould bemore difficult to fine tune in the case of
greyhounds than in harness racing, it ismoredifficult topredict that that a dogwill
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run a place than that a pacer or trotterwouldfinish in themoney.As to evidence of
deliberate underperformance, there simply is none. Even after allowing for the
quality of the animal, as the regressions do, NOTJ animals significantly
outperform animals who are never plunged in every respect and every
regression! Furthermore, their performance is more or less on a par with those
animals plunged for a place, the coefficients relating to NOTJ and PPLUN being
very similar. They are outperformed only by animals plunged for awin and that is
not surprising since the latter are the direct beneficiaries of inside information.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The is a wealth of anecdotal evidence to the effect that cheating occurs in
animal racing industries world-wide.Whether or not such corruption is truly as
common as media reports sometimes imply has not hitherto been considered
from an econometric viewpoint. Our purpose has been to demonstrate whether
or not there is systematic price rigging in three Australian betting markets:
horse, harness and greyhound racing.We have presented a simplemodel which
derives the conditions underwhich it is optimal for insiders tomanipulate prices
via deliberate under-performance in some races. We have then shown how an
empirical analysis of the relationship between win and place probabilities in
conjunction with observed patterns of betting behavior, may be used to
establish the presence of price rigging. We find no evidence that there is
significant systematic price rigging in these markets.
V. APPENDIX
An Example Model of a Race.
Suppose the animals run independently of each other as if on different tracks
or in separate lanes. Each animal i has a distributionF
i
(t)where t is the difference
between the time it takes animal i to complete the given distance and the best time
it takes the best animal of the trade, not necessarily running in any given race.We
assume this distribution is exponential, i.e., F
i
ðtÞ ¼ 12 e
2l
i
t
whose density is
f
i
ðtÞ ¼ l
i
e
2l
i
t
. It is not an attractive assumption but it facilitates much the
exposition of the example.
11
The mean time of animal i is 1=l
i
. The probability
that animal i wins the race is:
p
i
¼
ð
1
0
j–i
Y
ð12 F
j
ðtÞÞf
i
ðtÞdt ¼
ð
1
0
j–i
Y
e
2l
j
t
l
i
e
2l
i
t
dt
¼ l
i
ð
1
0
e
2t
P
n
j¼1
l
j
dt ¼
l
i
P
n
j¼1
l
j
ðA1Þ
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Let p ¼ ðp
1
; p
2
; . . . . . . ; p
n
Þ be the true winning probabilities of the n
animals in a race. Now suppose deliberate underperformance and that the
animals’ effort vector in race j is ðð f
j
1
; s
j
1
Þ; ð f
j
2
; s
j
2
Þ; . . . . . . ; ð f
j
n
; s
j
n
ÞÞ. A animal
that does not try has a zero chance to win and for the trying ones it is the
conditional probability given that the non-trying animals are out of the race
provided at least one animal is trying. If none is trying the probabilities are
undefined and one may define them as 1/n for all animals. We assume such a
case never arises. So
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where the second equality follows for our special case of exponential
distributions.
What is the “place” probability of animal i, i.e. that it runs first, second or
third in the race? We shall derive it from p in steps.
First, what is the probability that animal i runs second? For that to happen
another animal k has to win the race and i has to win among the remaining
n 2 1 animals. That event is exactly identical to the event that i wins given
that k does not participate in the race. The conditional probability of that,
given the absence (or victory) of k is, applying Bays’ rule,
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l
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P
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.
The numerator is the probability of the intersection of the two events
“i wins” and “j does not win”. The denominator is the probability of the event
“j does not win”. Considering the probable identities the winning animal k
may assume we get the probability for animal i to run second
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What is the probability that animal i runs third? That event happens when
some animal j wins the race, some animal k wins among the remaining
animals and runs second and, finally, animal i wins among the rest and runs
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third. Applying the reasoning as in (A3) we obtain now
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Now we are equipped to calculate the place probability of animal i, i.e.
that it runs first, second or third. Since these three events are mutually
exclusive the place probability is the sum of its win probability plus the
probability of running second plus the probability of running third, i.e.
place
i
¼ p
i
þ €p
i
þ pffl
i
ðA5Þ
which sum up to three over the race.
Now enter deliberate underperformance, (A3) and (A4) are modified
respectively to
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2.The Inverted U-shaped Place-only Curve
As animal i in a given race gets better, i.e. its probability p
i
of winning the
race increases at the expense of all other animals in the race, its probability of
running second or third changes accordingly. For small values of p
i
, when it
increases, the chances of second or third place grow as well but eventually for
large enough p
i
they decline since the chances of winning the race must be in
conflict with those of running second or third.
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One can see this pattern even in a simple example of four runners with
probabilities 0.1, 0.2, 0.4 and 0.5. Assuming exponential distributions, their
respective probabilities of running second or third are 0.3488, 0.5587, 0.5702
and 0.5221. The best animal has a lower probability of running a place than
the inferior animals.
To show formally this property of the probability of running second or
third one must first specify how the probability of each of the other animals
changes when p
i
changes. We shall now assume that they change
proportionally, i.e. that the ratio of the probabilities of any pair of two other
animals remains constant. One simple way to do it is to change only l
i
.
Let p
1
; . . . . . . ; p
n
be the initial probabilities of the n animals and
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the new ones. Define the new probabilities as the following
n 2 1 functions of x
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This functions pass through (p
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), they sum up to 1 2 x
i
as
required and are the only ones that satisfy our assumption of proportionality.
Denoting by P
i
the probability of i running second or third, we get by applying
the functions:
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To ascertain the inverted U shape differentiate
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Since the two squared brackets are positive, for small enough x
i
the P
i
curve is rising while for x
i
. 0.5 it is declining.†
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3. The Data
The data set was compiled from pre- and post- greyhound, horse and
harness race postings onto the Victoria region TABCORP web site
(www.tabcorp.com.au) and comprises 3599 greyhound races with 28792
dogs (May 1998 through April 1999), 3569 thoroughbred horse races with
41787 horses (May 1998 through May 1999) and 4983 standardbred horse
races with 49561 horses (January 1998 through April 1999). Race data were
obtained from the remote site using a command driven http browser (LYNX)
and PERL operating on the university’s UNIX network. Starting between
4 and 7 hours before the start of the day’s races a list of available races
were downloaded and start times for harness races extracted. Starting from
70 minutes prior to the posted start time each race’s information was then
saved from the remote site in Victoria onto the local host at Bar Ilan
University. Each file was updated periodically so that any new information
between 2 hours to the final post-race results could usually be obtained. Due to
the dynamic nature of the data acquisition, disruptions in internet access
caused by overload of either the local (Bar Ilan) or remote site (Victoria)
resulted in loss of information to the data set. This loss was without any
discernible pattern and therefore should have no systemic influence on the
analysis.
During the tabulation of the data from individual races downloaded into
the final data set, updates were expressed according to their occurrence
relative to the actual rather than the posted start time for each race for posting
times less than 30 minutes before the listed start time. This adjustment was
necessary since in 20.4% of the races the actual start time of the race was up to
10 minutes later than the listed start time displayed on the Victoria TABCORP
web page. We assume that bettors on-course adjust their betting behavior to
delays in the start of a race.
NOTES
1. See, for example, Duggan and Levitt (2002), Jacob and Levitt (2003), Mauro (1995) and Porter and Zona
(1993).
2. See The Independent, 17 August, 2006. http://sport.independent.co.uk/general/article1218382.ece.
3. See http://www.buzzle.com/editorials/7-27-2006-103739.asp.
4. The most famous incidence of corruption in the Australian racing industry in recent years concerns the
bookmaker, Robbie Waterhouse. See, for example, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/04/21/
1050777213845.html.
5. Here and throughout this paper, we use the Australian meaning of the word “place”; namely, that the
animal runs first, second or third. To run a place is thus equivalent to what is known in US racing as
“showing”.
6. In the empirical part of the paper, we consider only races with 8 or more starters.
7. The form of regression was developed by Mc Fadden (1973) and first used in the context of explaining
winning probabilities by Figlewski (1979). It has subsequently become the most popular regression for
this purpose.
8. See, for example, Ramanathan (2002).
9. The data were obtained as prospective win and place tote payouts and thus include breakage of 10 cents.
Since rounding causes a larger percentage error for small odds than for large odds, we follow Griffith
(1949) and assume continuous payouts rather than payouts falling into 10 cent intervals. The easiest way
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to accomplish this is to assume that for a sufficiently large number of observations, the mean payout
before rounding will fall half way between the actual payout and the next payout up. In practice, this
amounts to adding 5 cents to the projected payouts before calculating probability equivalents.
10. An animal is said to have been plunged (either for the win or the place) if he probability equivalent of
the prospective tote odds rises by no less than 5 percent between 15 minutes before the race and the
close of betting.
11. For similar, but alternative, approaches to the modeling of outcome probabilities in horse racing, see
Harville (1973), Henery (1981) and Lo and Bacon-Schone (1994).
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